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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In one of the first executive orders signed after his inauguration, President 
Donald J. Trump directed the Office of United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) to withdraw the United States as a signatory to the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) reached with eleven 
Pacific nations during the Obama administration and to “permanently” 
withdraw from any further TPP negotiations.  President Trump expressly 
declared in this document that it was the intention of his administration “to 
deal directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis in 
negotiating future trade deals.”1  He further directed USTR to begin pursuing 
“bilateral trade negotiations to promote American industry, protect American 
workers, and raise American wages.”2 
The President’s background in private business traces a path of real estate 
deals exhibiting his approach to most decision making.  It is often said that 
he has a “transactional” rather than a strategic perspective.  He has the 
reputation of a shrewd businessman who makes decisions quickly—some say 
impulsively—based on his assessment of the transaction at hand, viewing his 
goals in every deal as a zero-sum game.  One side wins and the other side 
necessarily loses.  Generally, the businessman’s goals are narrowly focused 
on maximizing monetary profit for immediate or long-term gain.  Within the 
bounds of fiduciary responsibilities and legal and ethical rules, this focus is 
appropriate to satisfy shareholders, business partners, and personal needs.  
Every tool, from economic dominance to filing bankruptcy, can be employed 
to gain leverage for winning or preserving profit.  In a private trade 
transaction, it is understandable that the businessperson may be able to bring 
greater leverage in a one-on-one, bilateral transaction negotiating with a 
party with fewer resources, rather than try to reach agreement with multiple 
parties with diverse interests and potentially enhanced leverage with 
combined resources.   
In the political economy of the post-World War II era, however, the 
United States has been the principal architect of the nondiscriminatory 
multilateral trading system in an effort to promote and sustain economic 
stability among scores of state actors with economies engaged in rules-based, 
free market trade.  A critical question immediately comes to mind from the 
Trump administration’s decision to terminate multilateral trade agreements 
and direct USTR to focus engagement on bilateral, country-by-country trade 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Memorandum on Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).  
 2 Id.; Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Details Plan to Rewrite Global Trade Rules, TIME, 
http://time.com/4385989/donald-trump-trade-china-speech/ (last updated June 28, 2016). 
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agreements: Is this the beginning of the end of the rules-based liberal 
economic order created in the post-war years to settle disputes and reduce 
discriminatory trade barriers through a multilateral trading system? 
II.  CORDELL HULL AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE MULTILATERAL 
SYSTEM 
Most of the free world has lived under the economic stability of the 
predominantly nondiscriminatory trading system of the multilateral General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) initiated in 1948, which has 
continued under the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.  This 
system was constructed on the ruins not only of two world wars, but the trade 
wars of the interwar years and the Great Depression.  When Franklin D. 
Roosevelt defeated President Herbert Hoover in the 1932 election, at the 
onset of the Depression, he selected as his Secretary of State Senator Cordell 
Hull (D-TN), who led the long struggle to create this system.  Hull, as a 
congressman in 1916, had begun calling for an “international trade congress” 
to be formed among all commercial nations to promote peace through fair 
trade and the avoidance of trade warfare.3   
An ardent life-long proponent of free trade, Hull led the opposition on the 
Ways and Means Committee against the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
of 1930 that brought U.S. protective tariff levels to nearly the highest levels 
in history and provoked retaliatory trade measures against American exports 
in an already depressed world economy.4  In an era when the United States 
had the largest, but also the most protected, market in the world and other 
nations engaged in trade wars or traded on mercantilist principles of bilateral 
barter, Secretary of State Hull began slowly to bring tariffs down and 
transform the trading system one country at a time using broad authority 
granted by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934.   
Hull waged the struggle to create this system against both domestic and 
foreign opposition forces.  Unlike the battles Hull had waged against 
protectionist Republicans in Congress—who had fiercely protected domestic 
manufacturers against imports since the Civil War—his trade opponents 
were often found within his own party.  Although President Roosevelt 
supported a more liberal trade program, Hull was forced into internecine 
                                                                                                                   
 3 42 CONG. REC. 10,653–54 (July 8, 1916). 
 4 For a discussion of Smoot-Hawley Act generally, its comparative tariff levels and 
retaliation against it, see C. DONALD JOHNSON, THE WEALTH OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF 
TRADE POLITICS IN AMERICA 190–204 (2018); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM: 
SMOOT-HAWLEY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 105–08 (2011); JOSEPH M. JONES, JR., TARIFF 
RETALIATION: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HAWLEY-SMOOT BILL 35–53, 75, 112–40, 211 (1934).  
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combat with some of the New Deal insiders of the Roosevelt administration 
who saw Hull’s trade idealism as a distraction, at best, from their domestic 
programs addressing unemployment.  The New Dealers’ solutions were 
focused on increasing domestic purchasing power, and trade promotion 
policy was not among those solutions.  Generally viewed as economic 
nationalists, the New Deal planners were not enamored by free trade 
philosophy, and, in fact, they feared that a focus on tariff reform might be at 
cross purposes with their own domestic recovery plans.  In the second year 
of the Roosevelt Administration, however, Hull overcame most of the New 
Deal opposition to his trade program when FDR enthusiastically proposed 
and easily passed the RTAA through Congress.5   
Nevertheless, a major new internal problem developed after Roosevelt 
appointed George N. Peek in December 1933 to be his special assistant on 
foreign trade.  Much of the trade policy debate throughout 1934 and 1935 
was dominated by the conflict between Hull’s internationalist approach and 
Peek’s nationalistic perspective.  Peek was a former farm implement 
manufacturer who had been vice president of John Deere and Company and 
president of the Moline Plow Company.  A firm believer in maintaining a 
favorable balance of trade through export subsidies and dumping surplus 
agriculture products in foreign markets, Peek had been trying to implement 
his trade beliefs as head of the Agriculture Adjustment Administration 
(AAA) even before becoming FDR’s foreign trade assistant in the White 
House.  At the AAA, he came into direct conflict with Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Undersecretary Rex Tugwell.  Wallace 
had become one of Hull’s allies on trade.  Wallace’s influential pamphlet, 
America Must Choose, supporting the RTAA, had even attracted the 
endorsement of Henry L. Stimson, Hoover’s Secretary of State.6  Tugwell, 
one of the original members of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust and a New Deal 
economist, was no friend to Hull’s laissez-faire trade policies, which 
Tugwell considered anachronistic, but he strongly opposed Peek’s export 
dumping proposals because he was attempting to raise farm prices and 
reduce surplus agriculture through domestic production controls.  Tugwell 
advised Wallace that dumping American farm exports would only provoke 
retaliation.   
                                                                                                                   
 5 78 CONG. REC. 3,579-80 (Mar. 2, 1934); Tariff Bill Voted by Senate, 57 to 33; Adjournment 
Dims, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1934), https://www.nytimes.com/1934/06/05/archives/tariff-bill-vote 
d-by-senate-57-to-33-adjournment-dims-house-adopts.html. 
 6 H.L. Stimson Urges Tariff Authority for the President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1934), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/1934/04/30/archives/hl-stimson-urges-tariff-authority-for-the-president-hoov 
ers.html; HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 
298–99 (1948).  
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Roosevelt often chose subordinates with conflicting views so that he 
could play one against the other and be free to make his own decisions.  The 
President’s selection of Peek, first perhaps to counterbalance Wallace and 
then to spar with Hull, suited his decision-making process.  George Peek saw 
in his new job in the White House an opportunity to take over trade policy 
coordination and to neutralize Hull’s liberal trade goals.  While Hull was out 
of the country, Peek submitted a plan to the President for reorganization of 
the administration’s trade policy apparatus which put him at the helm.  
Opposition to Peek’s plan came naturally from the State Department, and 
Wallace joined Commerce Secretary Daniel C. Roper in weighing in on 
Hull’s side against Peek’s proposal.  Roosevelt ultimately confirmed that 
Hull and the State Department would be in charge of RTAA trade 
negotiations, but not before he further entrenched Peek as a problem for Hull 
by naming him head of the newly created Office of the Special Adviser on 
Foreign Trade.  Further, the President endowed Peek’s office with a huge 
budget for statistical analysis and appointed him president of the newly 
established Export-Import Bank of Washington (Exim Bank).  The Exim 
Bank was created initially to finance export sales to the Soviet Union and 
Cuba, but Peek immediately began to use it to pursue his own trade program, 
which ran diametrically counter to Hull’s efforts.   
For Hull, a critical aspect of the trade program was the requirement he 
had imposed that agreements under the RTAA be negotiated under the 
unconditional “most-favored-nation” (MFN) principle—that is, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis with all trading partners that did not discriminate 
against the United States.  This requirement allowed Hull to multilateralize 
the tariff reductions obtained in bilateral agreements.  Simply stated, it 
worked as follows: If in bilateral negotiations with country X, the United 
States agreed to reduce tariffs on a particular product, it committed also to 
grant this tariff reduction on the same product from all other countries that 
maintained nondiscriminatory tariffs on imports from the United States.  
Likewise, if country X later reduced the tariff on a product for a third country 
below the rate established in the agreement with the United States, country X 
committed to grant the same reduction on that product when imported from 
the United States.  Thus, among the group of nations that practiced 
nondiscriminatory trade policies, trade restrictions reduced in bilateral 
agreements benefited all trade. 
MFN clauses had been included in bilateral trade agreements for 
centuries.  The principle was employed in the first United States treaty, a 
1788 agreement with France, and in the controversial Jay Treaty with Great 
Britain in 1794.  George Washington endorsed the concept in his famous 
Farewell Address, in which he declared “our commercial policy should hold 
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an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or 
preferences.”7  But since the eighteenth century most of these clauses were 
employed in a conditional form.  Under this practice, concessions granted by 
the United States in bilateral trade agreements were extended to third 
countries only on the condition that the third country “pay” for them by 
granting concessions of equivalent value to the United States.  Although the 
conditional approach sounds reasonable in theory, the practical effect of 
requiring specific payments for nondiscriminatory trade concessions 
produced perpetual market distortions as countries haggled over an 
acceptable “price” for each concession in negotiations that had to be repeated 
every time a country granted a new concession undercutting rates included in 
previous agreements.  Even when an agreement resolved the distortion in 
rates, exporters lost market share during the period of discrimination, and the 
process was never-ending.  The conditional approach also made broad tariff 
reductions difficult, if not impossible, to implement.   
During the Harding administration, Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes finally abandoned the use of conditional MFN policy in favor of the 
unconditional approach.  Under Secretary Hughes the United States signed 
the first unconditional MFN agreement with Germany in December 1923 and 
converted a number of existing preferential agreements to nondiscriminatory 
arrangements.  But as exorbitant rates—guarded by ardent Republican 
Senate protectionists—prevailed in the decade that followed, there was little 
interest in or hope for ratification of trade agreements of any kind.  Many 
agreements with major trading partners, such as Great Britain, continued in 
the conditional format, and some agreements had no MFN provision at all, as 
was the case with Canada.  
In stark contrast to Hull’s almost religious fervor for an international 
trading system with reduced barriers and no preferences or discrimination, 
George Peek saw the reciprocal trade program as an opportunity to sell 
surplus American products through one-on-one horse trading for national 
advantage without regard to broader multilateral implications.  He urged the 
President to “return to the traditional realistic policy of conditional most-
favored-nation treatment,” charging that Hull’s unconditional MFN policy 
amounted to “unconditional economic disarmament.”8  The RTAA provided 
that duties arrived at under the contemplated agreements and proclaimed 
under the Act would apply to imports from “all foreign countries” except 
countries that discriminated against American commerce and Cuba, which 
                                                                                                                   
 7 FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, THE WAY FORWARD: THE AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM 100 (1939). 
 8 GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FIGHT FOR FARM PARITY 276 (1954). 
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had an established U.S. tariff preference program.  This provision appears to 
have supported Hull’s view, but the language was vague enough for 
alternative interpretations, especially in view of the Act’s express purpose of 
“expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States.”9  
For a period of time, there was some uncertainty as to which approach the 
President favored after he told a press conference that with most nations 
having withdrawn into a policy of economic nationalism and self-
sufficiency, his best hope for the trade program was “to get some special 
agreements with different countries . . . on a barter basis.”10  In mid-
December 1934, Hull received an urgent message that the President had 
tentatively approved a barter agreement just negotiated by Peek with 
Germany.  Essentially, the agreement provided for the sale of 800,000 bales 
of cotton under a complicated formula that allowed the Germans to pay one-
fourth of the price to the Exim Bank (under Peek’s leadership) in dollars and 
the remainder in Deutschmarks.  The bank would then sell the German 
currency at a discount to American importers exclusively for the purchase of 
wine, fertilizer, and other goods from Germany.  Under the fiercely 
nationalistic economic policies implemented by German Chancellor Adolph 
Hitler and his Minister of Economics and Reichsbank President, Dr. Hjalmar 
H.G. Schacht, to finance German recovery and rearmament, Germany was 
entering into a number of these bilateral barter arrangements.  Schacht had 
recently announced that Germany would terminate its unconditional MFN 
commitment with the United States.  Peek’s deal effectively subsidized 
German exports to the United States, thus discriminating against competing 
exports from other foreign sources.   
Hull was shocked and outraged.  He knew that Peek had been negotiating 
with the Germans but was preoccupied with his own negotiations with 
Brazil, which he hoped would lead to the first agreement under the RTAA.11  
If the German deal went through, it would stop the Brazilian negotiations in 
their tracks and potentially destroy Hull’s entire trade program.  The actual 
bilateral trade implications of the potential agreement with Brazil were not 
significant.  To Hull, however, the issue was much bigger than bilateral trade 
benefits.  The US–Brazil agreement—one committed to unconditional MFN 
treatment with the largest economy in Latin America—would lay the 
                                                                                                                   
 9 SAYRE, supra note 7, at 205–06. 
 10 ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1932–1945, 
at 92 (1995). 
 11 While the first trade agreement concluded after the RTAA was signed into law was a 
preferential agreement with Cuba, negotiations on that agreement began before Roosevelt sent 
the trade agreements bill to Congress, and its terms were not part of Hull’s MFN trade 
program.  
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cornerstone for his policy in the Americas.  It would also make an important 
statement promoting his goal of ending trade restrictions in a new world 
economic order.  In a seven-to-one vote of the interagency committee 
approving Hull’s draft proposal for the Brazilian trade agreement, Peek was 
the lone dissenter.  Despite his apparent drift toward Peek’s point of view, 
the President approved Hull’s draft agreement with Brazil. 
When the Brazilian negotiators got word of the deal that Peek was 
making with the Germans, they submitted a protest to the State Department 
with a reminder that Brazil was also a major cotton exporter and that they 
had been stalling a German delegation seeking the same preferential barter 
with Brazil.  If the United States went through with the German agreement, 
the Brazilians said that they would have to accept their own German offer 
and defer negotiations with the United States indefinitely.  Other countries 
followed with reprisal threats in reaction to the possibility of American 
preferential treatment for German imports that were competitive with their 
own.  Chile, for instance, threatened to dump its fertilizer on the American 
market if it had to in order to compete with the German product shipped 
under preferential conditions. 
Hull met with the President and presented the case that the German 
agreement posed a devastating threat to the Brazilian negotiations and to all 
other possible agreements under the Act.  He believed that the agreement 
contravened the RTAA’s provision requiring equality of commercial 
treatment and that the Act did not contemplate discriminatory barter 
transactions.  The Secretary argued that a deal giving discriminatory market 
access to German imports was not even necessary to sell American cotton to 
Germany—a country desperate for cotton.  He thought the Germans, who 
were openly in default on two billion dollars in debt to the United States, 
were acting in bad faith in seeking a trade agreement with a creditor they had 
previously snubbed.  The agreement was, Hull said, “a very good trade 
bargain for Germany, but with little gain and large risks for the United 
States. . . . The proposed plan is almost certain to engender extreme 
resentment among that large section of the American public which is 
violently opposed to the Hitler regime.”12 Under the weight of Hull’s 
argument, affirmed by the support of all of the relevant cabinet secretaries, 
Roosevelt relented and withdrew his approval of Peek’s agreement.   
Most of the national media and economic scholars favored Hull’s policy, 
derisively referring to the views of his opponent as “Peekonomics.”13  The 
                                                                                                                   
 12 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 373–74 (1948); see also Divided 
Counsels, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1935), https://www.nytimes.com/1935/05/13/archivees/divid 
ed-counsels.html. 
 13 FITE, supra note 8, at 279. 
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Washington Post called Peek’s plan “essentially unworkable” and said Hull’s 
was on “strong ground” and the only one that offered any expectation of 
future trade expansion.14  But Peek had his own political and academic 
supporters, mainly from the isolationist and protectionist camps.  The 
influential historian and later a prominent isolationist critic of FDR, Charles 
A. Beard, called Peek “the realist among the administration men engaged on 
the foreign trade side,” observing that “Peek’s mind does not seem to be 
encumbered by a thousand exploded economic dogmas that no longer fit the 
world of reality.”15  Peek continued publicly and ruthlessly to disparage the 
State Department’s trade policies.  At an Armistice Day speech, he finally 
stepped over the line.  He declared that the choice for the United States on 
trade policy and a broad range of other issues was between Americanism and 
internationalism.  “When we Americans choose—let us choose America,”16 
he concluded, implying that the administration was moving in an un-
American direction with laissez-faire policies that opened U.S. markets to 
foreign advantage.  The pro-Republican Washington Herald reported on 
Peek’s speech highlighting the slanted details of the choice with a supporting 
editorial headlined, “Sane Nationalism or Fatuous Internationalism—Which 
Shall It Be?”17  Roosevelt reacted with a letter to Peek, denouncing his 
misrepresentations of administration policy, calling the speech “rather silly,” 
and claiming it sounded “like a Hearst paper.”  The President even 
denounced one point in Peek’s speech as “a deliberate lie.”18  When Peek 
offered his resignation, the President promptly accepted.  With Peek’s 
departure, Hull and his trade policy had finally triumphed within the 
Roosevelt administration.   
Hull’s victory over Peek marked a turning point for his trade program, 
which now embedded internationalism into the economic fabric of the New 
Deal and signaled the beginning of a revolution in the governance of world 
trade.  With his trade philosophy now predominant and unchallenged within 
the administration, Hull signed the Brazilian agreement and secured 
unconditional MFN agreements with eight countries by the end of 1935.  But 
success for his ultimate goals remained far from certain on the road ahead.  
The Brazil deal drew virulent reaction from American manufacturers of 
products competing with imports receiving tariff concessions under the 
                                                                                                                   
 14 Mr. Hull and Mr. Peek, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1934; see also Divided Counsels, supra 
note 12.  
 15 FITE, supra note 8, at 279. 
 16 Id. at 281. 
 17 Sane Nationalism or Fatuous Internationalism—Which Shall It Be?, WASH. HERALD, 
Nov. 26, 1935. 
 18 FITE, supra note 8, at 284–85. 
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agreement.  Prompted by Peek, domestic producers worried about the MFN 
benefits to third country imports and brought their concerns to Congress 
where bipartisan criticism began to grow, forcing Hull and Roosevelt to 
combat this criticism each time the RTAA came up for renewal. 
At the same time, countries began lining up to become a part of the 
American MFN system to get out from under the Smoot-Hawley rates 
imposed on imports from countries without a nondiscriminatory trade 
agreement with the United States.  Under Hull’s leadership, the trade 
program, now more than ever, emphasized the broader goal of expanding 
world trade through a wider application of nondiscriminatory MFN treatment 
over the promotion of specific bilateral trade objectives.  Ironically, in 
negotiating the development of this system, the strongest foreign opposition 
force with which Hull and his successors at the State Department contended 
came from their allies in the Anglo-American special relationship that 
emerged during the same time period.  
To a large extent, Hull based his trade program on nineteenth century 
British free trade policies, which the U.K. government ultimately abandoned 
after World War I.  Hull’s goals now ran counter to the trade policies that 
Britain increasingly pursued in the 1930s, including, most importantly, the 
imperial preference system adopted at the Ottawa Imperial Conference of 
1931, which was implemented largely in reaction to the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930.  The discriminatory preferences created a sterling bloc 
within the British Commonwealth that effectively denied access to American 
exports and restricted necessary raw materials otherwise available from the 
dominions of the Empire.   
Trade agreements Britain had recently concluded with Argentina, 
Germany, Italy, and other countries outside the Commonwealth were strictly 
designed to balance trade on a purely bilateral, barter basis, thus limiting 
commerce with other nations and obstructing the expansion of multinational 
trade.  Early in 1936, Hull began lecturing the British Ambassador to 
Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, on the importance of his program to 
international peace and prosperity.  He cited the sacrifice made by the United 
States of vast quantities of American cotton exports when it rejected the Peek 
barter arrangement with Germany that was similar to the current British 
agreements.  In addition, he referred to the absence of a barter requirement in 
the U.S.-Brazil agreement, an approach, Hull noted, that allowed Brazil to 
use the proceeds from exports to the United States, regardless of bilateral 
trade balances, to buy U.K. or other nations’ exports and increase 
multilateral trade.  He estimated that there was room for a $20 billion 
increase in international trade, which could provide employment for twelve 
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to fourteen million people and “would probably mark the difference between 
war and peace in Europe in the not distant future.”19 
The British were not moved by Hull’s sermons, especially as they 
emanated from a senior official representing a country still maintaining 
prohibitive tariffs at the world’s highest levels.  Opposition to returning to 
nondiscriminatory trade policies came principally from the British Treasury 
and Board of Trade, whose senior officials were skeptical of the likelihood 
that American protectionism would diminish.  Neville Chamberlain, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the son of the imperialist Member of 
Parliament Joseph Chamberlain, who as Colonial Secretary at the turn of the 
twentieth century had led a failed movement promoting imperial preferences 
and urged an end to British free trade policies.  After a difficult period of 
negotiations, Hull finally reached a modest trade agreement with Britain, 
which included some minor breaches in the preferential wall around the 
Empire in November 1938.  The effective lifespan of this agreement was 
short due to Britain’s declaration of war in September 1939, but the issues 
raised by the imperial preferences lived on as a stumbling block for future 
U.S.-U.K. negotiations for years. 
The nondiscriminatory trade principle came up on important occasions in 
the development of the special Anglo-American relationship during and after 
World War II.  Dealing with the legal limitations of neutrality imposed by 
Congress and a cash-short Britain, Roosevelt came up with the Lend-Lease 
military aid program that did not require Britain to pay for the aid in dollars 
or loans.  Rather, the provisions of the Act authorizing Lend-Lease allowed 
“payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect 
benefit which the President deems satisfactory.”20  With Hull and the State 
Department overseeing how the “indirect benefit,” commonly referred to 
later as “the Consideration,”21 would be defined after the hostilities ended, 
this provision would have a huge impact on post-war economic restructuring.  
Hull immediately seized on the language as leverage to eliminate the 
Commonwealth’s imperial preferences in future trade negotiations—leverage 
he did not have in reaching the pre-war bilateral trade agreement with 
Britain.  With this provision in the Lend-Lease Act, the State Department 
sought to define the Consideration for Lend-Lease aid as a commitment to 
nondiscriminatory trade practices even though the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Aid 
Agreement was yet to be negotiated and Congress had not yet approved the 
$7 billion appropriation to fund the aid.  
                                                                                                                   
 19 HULL, supra note 12, at 521.  
 20 An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, Pub. L. No. 11, § 3(b), 55 Stat. 32 
(1941) (emphasis added). 
 21 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 12 (2008).  
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In August 1941, for the first time since each had become head of his 
respective government, President Roosevelt met with Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill secretly aboard war ships in Placentia Bay off the coast of 
Newfoundland in what would become known as the Atlantic Conference.  
Roosevelt had been planning the meeting for months in order to discuss war 
aims.  It was his intention to issue a joint declaration aimed at educating the 
American public as to what was at stake in the conflict and to generate public 
opinion against isolationists in Congress.  Churchill also enthusiastically 
desired the meeting but with a more specific purpose in mind—tying the 
United States to the war effort.  After several days of meetings, the two 
leaders issued an unsigned joint declaration, later dubbed the “Atlantic 
Charter,” setting forth the guiding principles “on which they base their hopes 
for a better future” in the post-war world.  While the meeting began molding 
the intimate personal relationship between the two leaders that became 
vitally important to the future alliance and prosecution of the war, it also 
drew attention to the stark differences each leader represented in his 
historical outlook on world affairs and, in particular, on imperialism.  This 
difference was manifested in the drafting of the provision of the declaration 
guaranteeing post-war access to equal trade to all nations. 
Roosevelt preferred a requirement that access to trade be “without 
discrimination and on equal terms.”  Churchill, however, insisted on 
language that allowed deference to the Ottawa Agreement preferences, 
arguing that the nondiscrimination commitment would require convening a 
conference of the British Commonwealth for approval.  This would take 
time, which neither party had, because Churchill wanted to begin the aid 
flow as soon as possible and Roosevelt wanted the declaration released 
promptly to begin using it to mobilize domestic support for his efforts on 
behalf of the allied cause against Hitler.  Against persistent opposition from 
the State Department (Hull did not attend due health issues), the President 
finally gave in to Churchill and accepted the following language for the 
paragraph describing the trade principle: 
[The U.S. and the U.K.] will endeavor, with due respect for 
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, 
great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, 
to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are 
needed for their economic prosperity;22 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 3 Bevans 686, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/w 
wii/atlantic.asp. 
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Although the principle called for trade to be “on equal terms,” it did not 
expressly prohibit “discrimination” and included the phrase urged by 
Churchill, “with due respect for their existing obligations,” a loophole 
allowing the Ottawa preferences to survive.  
On February 23, 1942, the British signed the Mutual Aid Agreement 
containing the following language in Article VII describing the 
Consideration for Lend-Lease aid: 
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the 
United States of America by the Government of the United 
Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress 
of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be 
such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but 
to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between 
them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations.  To 
that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to 
participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the 
expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, 
of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption 
of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and 
welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the 
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and in general, to 
the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the 
Joint Declaration made on Aug. 12, 1941 [the Atlantic 
Charter], by the President of the United States of America and 
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.23 
 In a message sent to Churchill, urging the British Cabinet to approve 
Article VII, Roosevelt assured them that the United States was not asking for 
a commitment in advance to abolish Empire preference.24  This message 
cleared the logjam blocking settlement of the Lend-Lease aid agreement, but 
it clouded the meaning of Article VII, which would be a critical element and 
a source of much friction in postwar trade negotiations.  While many in the 
State Department would persistently cite the provision as a commitment to 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement, U.S.-U.K., art. VII, Feb. 28, 1942, 56 Stat. 1433, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/angam42.asp (emphasis added). 
 24 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1942, GENERAL; THE 
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: THE FAR EAST, VOL. I, at 535–36 (1960), https://history.state.gov/ 
historicaldocuments/frus1942v01. 
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end the discriminatory imperial preferences, the British, equally inaccurately, 
recorded in their Cabinet minutes that Roosevelt had affirmed that there was 
no such commitment and that these preferences “should be excluded from 
our discussions.”25 
The difficult Anglo-American negotiations over discriminatory trade 
preferences and MFN did not end when the United States entered the war 
and the special relationship was enhanced by a military alliance.  The tough 
trade negotiations continued during and after the war, even as the United 
States came to the financial aid of Britain to alleviate the destruction and 
depletion of resources caused by the war.  Temporary exceptions were 
allowed in the GATT for reconstruction, development, and the 
Commonwealth preference arrangements.  Yet, despite the objections of the 
British and other countries seeking preferential arrangements and permanent 
exceptions from the rules, Cordell Hull and his disciples at the State 
Department, such as Will Clayton, the first Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, infused the nondiscriminatory trade principles in the 
commercial policy provisions of the GATT.  The unconditional MFN 
principle, requiring nondiscriminatory treatment among all the GATT 
contracting parties, is firmly established in Article I, the cornerstone of the 
agreement and now of the WTO.  A national treatment standard also required 
nondiscriminatory treatment between imported and domestically produced 
goods with respect to internal taxation and regulation.  Standards on 
antidumping and countervailing duties procedures, as well as safeguard 
measures under the escape clause and other measures, were provided to 
establish a code of nondiscriminatory practices for the contracting parties.26   
These principles were not new to the British; their experts had 
collaborated with the State Department in formulating the Proposals for the 
failed International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter in 1945.  Hull had 
included similar provisions in trade agreements negotiated under the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the British had employed 
nondiscriminatory principles before retreating from free trade after the First 
World War.  The senior experts from the United States and the United 
Kingdom had collaborated with common objectives in 1942–1943 as they 
began crafting the outline for a “Commercial Union” and a multilateral trade 
agreement in pursuit of the economic goals for the post-war world described 
                                                                                                                   
 25 L.S. PRESSNELL, EXTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE THE WAR: VOL 1: THE POST-WAR 
FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT 59 (1987). 
 26 For a thorough discussion of the GATT provisions, their negotiation history, and legal 
significance see KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); IRWIN 
ET AL., supra note 21. 
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in the Atlantic Charter.  The devastating impact of the war on the world’s 
economy, however, made these plans less practicable.  Most of the countries 
participating in the U.N. Preparatory Conferences during 1946–1947 in 
London and New York, which led to the GATT agreement in Geneva and the 
ITO talks in Havana in 1948, did so either to avoid being left out of 
assistance programs such as the Marshall Plan or to avoid being excluded 
from any trade deal organized by the United States (the country with the 
largest import market in the world).  Few were drawn to these negotiations 
because they shared, with Hull, Clayton, and the presidents they served, the 
belief that freer trade under uniform principles of fair-dealing set out in the 
GATT or the draft ITO Charter would bring economic stability and 
prosperity to the world and underpin American prosperity.  Only the United 
States had the economic strength and dedicated interest to carry this long-
term strategy of building a nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system 
with such broad goals.27 
III.  THE TRUMP TRADE DOCTRINE 
The trade goals of the Trump administration, even as they first emerged 
during the 2016 presidential election, are much more narrowly focused than 
the broad strategic goals of the Roosevelt-Truman State Department.  As 
senior policy advisors to the Trump campaign in September 2016, Wilbur 
Ross, now Secretary of Commerce, and Peter Navarro, an economics 
professor at the University of California-Irvine business school and currently 
a senior trade advisor in the White House, issued a report, “Scoring the 
Trump Economic Plan,” in rebuttal to the conclusion reached in the non-
partisan (though conservative “supply-side” analysis) by the Tax Foundation 
of Trump’s tax plan.28  The Tax Foundation Report predicted that Trump’s 
plan would cost $2.6 trillion in revenue losses to the U.S. Treasury.  The 
Ross-Navarro Report called the Tax Foundation Report “incomplete and 
highly misleading,” because it isolates the tax cuts from revenue offsets they 
predict will come from Trump’s “synergistic suite of trade, regulatory, and 
energy policy reforms.”29   
                                                                                                                   
 27 For a more thorough discussion of negotiations of Anglo-American trade negotiations, 
including the postwar GATT and International Trade Organization negotiations, see JOHNSON, 
supra note 4, at 314–402. 
 28 Alan Cole, Details and Analysis of the Donald Trump Tax Reform Plan, TAX 
FOUNDATION (Sept. 19, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/details-analysis-donald-trump-tax-pla 
n-2016/. 
 29 Peter Navarro & Wilbur Ross, Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory & 
Energy Policy Impacts, DONALD J. TRUMP 1, 2 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump. 
com/Trump_Economic_Plan.pdf. 
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On the trade piece, Ross and Navarro argue that Trump’s “tough, smart” 
negotiators will renegotiate every one of the “poorly negotiated trade deals,” 
dating “back to at least 1993,” coinciding with presidency of William J. 
Clinton.30  Renegotiations would be conducted according to the “Trump 
Trade Doctrine,” which they defined as ensuring that “any deal must increase 
the GDP growth rate, decrease the trade deficit, and strengthen the U.S. 
manufacturing base.”31  The deals to be renegotiated include not only 
NAFTA and other regional and bilateral free trade agreements completed 
under Presidents Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, but also 
the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.  Ross and 
Navarro propose that the WTO be amended to favor and give more control to 
the United States based upon its leverage as the largest importer, third-largest 
exporter, and currently the largest economy in the world.  They boldly 
forecast that the Trump Trade Doctrine will eliminate the overall U.S. trade 
deficit of $500 billion, end off-shoring of American jobs, and rebuild 
America’s manufacturing base.  Suffice to say, it will take more than “smart, 
tough” negotiators to pull off this miraculous trifecta, but they do not stop 
there with bold predictions.   
In addition to the increased revenue they project to be derived from 
regulatory and energy reforms, the Report predicts that Trump’s trade 
policies alone will produce $2.44 trillion in revenues to offset the revenue 
loss from the proposed tax cut.32  The President called Navarro “a visionary 
economist”33 when he selected him to serve as the White House inside guru 
on trade policy, but more realistic experts would describe this paper as 
offering only delusions of grandeur. 
Navarro explained his approach to eliminating the trade deficit to the 
Wall Street Journal in terms that would be familiar to the eighteenth century 
mercantilists and to the Germans during the inter-war years under Hitler’s 
fiercely nationalistic Minister of Economics H.H.G. Schacht, who negotiated 
bilateral barter agreements.  It is the very approach Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull fought against in the 1930s when establishing the nondiscriminatory 
trade program under the RTAA beginning in 1934.  “Any country we have 
significant trade deficit with needs to work with us on a product-by-product 
and sector-by-sector level,” Navarro declared, “to reduce that deficit over a 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. at 17–18. 
 31 Id. at 17. 
 32 Id. at 19.   
 33 James Pethokoukis, My Old, but Still Fascinating (!), Chat with Trump’s Trade Guru, 
Peter, AEI (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/my-old-but-still-fascinating-chat-
with-trumps-trade-guru-peter-navarro/.  
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specified period of time.”34  This simple formula might seem reasonable in a 
government-controlled, nonmarket economy ruled by National Socialism or 
communism, but it is less than practical in a market-driven economy.  Trade 
agreements are about balancing the legal rules of trade; they are not intended 
to change the economics of supply and demand.  Navarro, following 
Trump’s political instincts, seems most interested in trying to exploit the 
trade deficit for political gain, regardless of its economic relevance to the 
U.S. economy.  
At the end of March, President Trump signed an executive order requiring 
a “systematic evaluation” of all bilateral trade deficits and all free trade 
agreements (FTAs), including the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the WTO, to determine the impact of these agreements and 
whether there have been violations, abuses, and what actions need to be 
taken with respect to them.35  The President put Secretary Wilbur Ross in 
charge of the evaluation, and Ross attempted to explain the project to the 
press assembled in the White House Briefing Room the day before the 
signing.  Like Navarro, Ross focused on the bilateral trade deficits because 
that is where the President directed his focus.  But of the countries with 
whom the United States has the top ten largest deficits, only two were 
involved in United States’ free trade agreements, but all were in the WTO—
China ($347 billion), Japan ($69 billion), Germany ($65 billion), Mexico 
($63 billion), Ireland ($36 billion), Vietnam ($32 billion), Italy ($28.5 
billion), South Korea ($28 billion), Malaysia ($25 billion), and India ($24 
billion).36   
Frankly, Ross showed surprisingly little understanding of the 
nondiscrimination principle that is a cornerstone of the GATT/WTO system, 
saying:  
[T]he President has talked a lot about [reciprocity]; namely if 
we have a country that has big trade barriers against us, we 
should logically have similar trade barriers against 
them. . . . The only problem is, the World Trade Organization 
has what’s called a “most favored nation clause,” meaning that 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Bob Davis, To Reduce Trade Deficit, White House Wants Partners to Buy American, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-reduce-trade-deficit-white-house-
wants-partners-to-buy-american-1489020691. 
 35 Doug Palmer, Trump on Trade: Scrutinize NAFTA, Other Deals for ‘Abuses,’ POLITICO 
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/28/trump-trade-nafta-abuses-237777. 
 36 Trump Orders Review of U.S. Trade Deficits with All Nations, Including Japan, JAPAN 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/01/national/trump-tells-offi 
cials-review-causes-u-s-trade-deficits/#.WrkEpdPwY1g. 
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of all the countries with whom we do not have a free-trade 
agreement, we must charge the same tariff on the same item to 
those . . . countries as we charge to the others.  So that’s a 
significant impediment toward getting to anything like a 
reciprocal agreement.37 
Secretary Ross seems to have missed the point that Secretary of State 
Hull entered into numerous bilateral agreements based upon reciprocity 
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act with the MFN clause central to 
the agreement to ensure that the United States would benefit from future 
tariff reduction granted by its trading partners.  The point he seems to be 
making here is that he favors returning to the period when discriminatory 
actions were permissible and trade wars were prevalent.  As noted earlier, the 
Navarro/Ross paper written during the campaign called for fundamental 
amendments to the WTO agreements based upon the leverage held by the 
United States as the number one importer in the world, the number three 
exporter, and with a trade deficit that equals the cumulative surplus of the 
rest of the world.  Citing this leverage again to the press, Ross said, “I 
wouldn’t dismiss the potential for seeking modification.”38  Although any 
such amendment seems unlikely, it is a very troubling proposition for those 
concerned about maintaining the liberal world trade order and the economic 
stability developed after the Second World War. 
IV.  LIGHTHIZER AND THE WTO 
Statutorily, the central figure on the Trump trade team is the President’s 
pick to lead USTR, Robert E. Lighthizer, despite the leading role played by 
Secretary Ross during Lighthizer’s long confirmation process.  An affable 
and highly competent trade lawyer-lobbyist, Lighthizer is arguably the most 
qualified of any of Trump’s initial cabinet appointees in terms of direct 
experience and specialized talent.  If the president is serious about 
dismantling the established liberal trade order and replacing it with a 
nationalistic, protectionist regime armed and ready for the trade wars to 
follow, he has chosen in Lighthizer a master technician equipped and 
possibly willing to lead the effort.  After a substantial tenure on Capitol Hill 
as chief counsel and staff director on the Senate Finance Committee under 
Chairman Bob Dole in the early 1980s, Lighthizer served for several years as 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Press Release, Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Commerce, Press Briefing by Secretary of Commerce 
Wilbur Ross on an Executive Order of Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses (Apr. 28, 2017), 
http://globaltraderelations.net/images/Article.Trump.Ross_Statement_April_ 28,_2017_.pdf.  
 38 Id. 
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Deputy USTR under President Ronald Reagan.  Reagan normally talked like 
a free trader but often walked like a protectionist with Lighthizer leading the 
march.  At a time when Japan was the most threatening trade ogre to 
American industry—the role now played by China—Reagan bashed Japan 
with every protectionist tool in the USTR arsenal.   
Much later, in private practice on the protectionist side, Lighthizer 
testified before the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee in 2007 
that the United States was being treated unfairly in the WTO dispute 
settlement system.39  He called the system “fundamentally flawed” with 
“rogue” WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions exceeding their mandate 
and engaging in “judicial activism,” a term no doubt employed to conjure up 
memories among conservatives of the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice Earl Warren.40  He charged that these decisions were “gutting our 
trade laws,” citing two instances where WTO decisions ultimately prompted 
legislation eliminating U.S. antidumping provisions that had given excessive 
advantages to U.S. domestic industry.41  The Manufacturers Alliance for 
Productivity and Innovation, however, disputed Lighthizer’s analysis with a 
study showing that over the previous five years the United States had 
“benefited substantially from its participation in WTO disputes, having 
prevailed in twice as many disputes as it lost.”42   
In a March 2008 op-ed piece in the New York Times, Lighthizer scolded 
the then presumptive Republican presidential nominee Senator John McCain 
for citing his unbridled support for free trade to “prove his bona fides as a 
conservative.”43  Lighthizer correctly noted that conservatives from 
Alexander Hamilton, who, Lighthizer wrote, “could be considered the 
founder of American conservatism,” to former Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) 
have opposed free trade.  President Reagan, “the personification of modern 
conservatism,” according to Lighthizer, “often broke with free-trade 
dogma.”44  From his own experience, Lighthizer reminded McCain that 
Reagan, despite his “open-markets rhetoric,” restricted imports of 
automobiles, steel, sugar, textiles, and motorcycles (to protect Harley-
                                                                                                                   
 39 Legislation Related to Trade with China: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the 
Comm. on Ways and Means U.S. H.R., 110th Cong. 103-23 (2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-110hhrg49994/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg49994.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Robert E. 
Lighthizer].  See also Study Rebuts Claim of U.S. Disadvantage in WTO Dispute Settlement, 
INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, May 14, 2008 (source on file with author).  
 40 Statement of Robert E. Lighthizer, supra note 39, at 116.  
 41 Id. at 116–17.  
 42 Study Rebuts Claim of U.S. Disadvantage in WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 39.  
 43 Robert E. Lighthizer, Grand Old Protectionists, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2008), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/03/06/opinion/06lighthizer.html. 
 44 Id.  
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Davidson); and Reagan “made Japanese imports more expensive” by forcing 
Japan to increase the value of the yen.45  Lighthizer declared that free trade is 
not the mantra of conservatives; it is rather the ideal of “liberal elites,” like 
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), who embrace it “with a passion that makes 
Robespierre seem prudent.”46  McCain has a long memory and did not forget 
this scolding when Lighthizer came up for confirmation nine years later.  He 
and Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) sent a long public letter to Lighthizer in a 
similarly scolding tone announcing their opposition to his nomination 
because of his “vocal advocacy for protectionist shifts in our trade policies, 
the Administration’s ongoing, incoherent, and inconsistent trade message,” 
and his “skepticism of NAFTA.”  They declared, “America deserves a USTR 
who will renegotiate NAFTA in order to build on its successes, not as a 
pretext for unraveling it.”47  
Three years after his op-ed on McCain, Lighthizer had better luck when 
he chose to enter the fray supporting the budding Donald Trump presidential 
campaign in 2012.  In an op-ed in the Washington Times, Lighthizer praised 
Trump for his anti-China protectionist rhetoric that was then being criticized 
within the GOP.  A potential Trump campaign would at least focus attention 
on China’s abusive trade practices, Lighthizer predicted, and thus “will have 
done a service to both the Republican Party and the country.”48  As a top 
lobbyist for the steel industry and lead counsel for the U.S. Steel Corporation 
in trade litigation, Lighthizer’s personal views on China and the WTO 
offered a legalistic version of Trump’s visceral reactions to trade questions.   
During the presidency of Barack Obama, Lighthizer admonished USTR 
for “wringing its hands” with China and urged aggressive and imaginative 
action to address the U.S.-China trade deficit.  The hand-wringing 
characterization of Obama’s USTR was not substantiated in the record.  
Obama filed twenty-five WTO cases during his two terms, including sixteen 
against China,49 all of which that were decided by the end of his second term 
having been won or settled favorably.  The aggressive new actions 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Id.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Press Release, Ben Sasse, Senator, U.S. Senate, Sasse and McCain Announce Opposition 
to President’s Nominee for Trade Representative (May 10, 2017), https://www.sasse.senate. 
gov/public/index.cfm/2017/5/sasse-and-mccain-announce-opposition-to-president-s-nominee-
for-trade-representative. 
 48 Robert E. Lighthizer, Lighthizer: Donald Trump Is No Liberal on Trade, WASH. TIMES 
(May 9, 2011), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/9/donald-trump-is-no-liber 
al-on-trade/. 
 49 FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration’s Record on the Trade Enforcement, WHITE 
HOUSE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/fa 
ct-sheet-obama-administrations-record-trade-enforcement. 
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Lighthizer proposed included some that had been rejected by the George W. 
Bush and Obama administrations as not sanctioned under the GATT/WTO 
agreements.  
Defending the aggressive approach, Lighthizer observed, “WTO 
commitments are not religious obligations.”50  He argued: 
The point is that an unthinking, simplistic and slavish 
dedication to the mantra of “WTO-consistency” . . . makes very 
little sense, and is plainly not dictated by our international 
obligations.  Indeed, derogation may be the only way to force 
change in the system.51   
At the time he made this statement—seven years before he would become 
USTR—he stated explicitly, “I am not advocating that the United States 
leave the WTO system—that body is too important to us and the global 
trading system.”52  A serious question arises, however, considering his lack 
of commitment to WTO obligations: Will he be willing to chuck the system 
that has effectively provided a rules-based, liberal trade order since 1948 
now that he is a member of a team determined to upend the political order 
under the slogan of America First? 
With strong bipartisan support, Lighthizer was overwhelmingly 
confirmed over McCain’s objection. 
Even before he was confirmed by the Senate to lead USTR, his influence 
was obvious in “The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda,” publically 
submitted to Congress by USTR, as required by statute, on March 1, 2017.  
This document declares: “It is time for a more aggressive approach. . . .  [I]t 
is time for a new trade policy that defends American sovereignty.”53  The 
new Trump agenda adopts Lighthizer’s view in the same language he 
expressed in 2010—that WTO commitments are not “religious 
obligations.”54  The agenda explains that “if a WTO dispute settlement 
panel—or the WTO Appellate Body—rules against the United States, such a 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Evaluating China’s Role in the World Trade Organization Over the Past Decade Before 
the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm., 111th Cong. 33 (2010) (Testimony of Robert 
E. Lighthizer, former deputy United States Trade Representative), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/6.9.10Lighthizer.pdf. 
 51 Id. at 35.  
 52 Id. at 33.  
 53 The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 1, 5, 9 
(2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-
%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf 
 54 Evaluating China’s Role in the World Trade Organization Over the Past Decade Before 
the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm., supra note 50. 
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ruling does not automatically lead to a change in U.S. law or 
practice . . . [and] the Trump Administration will aggressively defend 
American sovereignty over trade policy.”55  It promises that the Trump 
administration “will act aggressively as needed” to combat unfair trade 
practices through U.S. trade remedies, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, “when the WTO adopts interpretations of WTO agreements that 
undermine the ability of the United States” to employ these remedies.56 
I was among the majority of Members of Congress in 1994 who voted for 
the Uruguay Round implementing legislation that created the WTO and 
vividly remember insisting with others that the legislation make clear that 
WTO commitments and dispute decisions would not impact our national 
sovereignty and would not be binding on federal or state law.57  The WTO 
dispute settlement system, which is arguably the most effective international 
legal forum in world history, is based entirely on voluntary participation and 
compliance.  When a decision goes against the United States and would 
require a legislative change for compliance, Congress can ignore the decision 
if it so chooses.  That was what Congress did when Brazil won a WTO 
decision holding U.S. cotton subsidies to be in violation of WTO obligations.  
The winning side is authorized under WTO agreements to retaliate against 
the offending side by withdrawing trade concessions by, for example, raising 
tariffs against the member refusing to comply.  In an unusual outcome in the 
Brazil cotton case, the United States ultimately reached a monetary 
settlement favoring Brazilian farmers and retained the “illegal” subsidies for 
its cotton farmers.   
Since 1995, the WTO has handled over 500 disputes in a manner that has 
enhanced the rules-based trade system and thus maintained global economic 
stability.  On balance, these WTO decisions have been highly favorable to 
U.S. interests.  Prior to this system, the old GATT dispute process had 
serious weaknesses that made it less useful in the establishment of trade rules 
defining unfair trade practices.  As I recall as a Ways and Means staff 
assistant at the time, Congress, responding to this weakness, enacted Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a mechanism for unilateral enforcement by 
the United States of fair trade practices.  Among the strong motivations for 
creating a new dispute settlement system under the WTO in the Uruguay 
Round was the ineffectiveness of the GATT system for settling disputes and 
the criticisms against unilateral U.S. actions under Section 301.  After 1995, 
Section 301 has continued to be used for certain limited purposes, but 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. at 3.  
 56 Id. at 4.  
 57 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a)–(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)–
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expansion of its use as a vigilante-style, unilateral preference over the WTO 
dispute settlement process (as arguably contemplated under the 
Lighthizer/Trump agenda) poses serious risks of retaliation and trade wars in 
a wild-West style environment.  
The initial reactions to Trump’s 2017 Trade Agenda following its release 
have been mixed.  Naturally, the traditional protectionists have responded 
positively.  The American Alliance for Manufacturing, a partnership between 
import-sensitive domestic manufacturers and the United Steelworkers Union, 
praised it, observing that the WTO dispute system fails to respect “long-
standing recognition of the legitimacy of trade remedies.”58  The reaction on 
Capitol Hill, however, has been wary at best from trade leadership of both 
Parties.  Congressman Richard Neal (D-MA), the ranking Democrat on 
Ways and Means, agreed that the WTO dispute system deserves some 
criticism but said: “[I]t sounds like the Administration is considering a far 
too drastic response.  We need to fix the problems with the current 
international trading system, not scrap the system altogether.”59 
Congressman Kevin Brady (R-TX), chairman of Ways and Means, issued 
a statement agreeing with Trump’s effort to make a better deal for American 
workers, but defended the WTO: 
I strongly believe that our current trade agreements—including 
the WTO—have been successful for Americans because these 
agreements establish a firm rule of law to hold our competitors 
in check and open markets for us to sell our goods, services, 
and farm products.  However, I agree with President Trump 
that we should improve our trade agreements to make them 
better serve American workers.60 
With this degree of bipartisan support for the WTO in the House, it seems 
unlikely that the President would dump that organization as he has the Paris 
Climate Agreement, TPP, and other international agreements.  Under the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, any member of the Senate or House may 
introduce a joint resolution to revoke Congressional approval of the WTO 
agreements once every five years.  Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) introduced one in 
2000; Rep. Paul and Rep. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) tried again in 2005.  Neither 
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 60 Weston Williams, Trump Administration Says US May Defy WTO Rulings: What Does 
That Mean?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/20 
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resolution got many votes.  Embarrassingly to me as a Georgian, however, 
even though only twenty percent of the House voted in favor of the 2005 
resolution, a bipartisan majority of the Georgia delegation voted to revoke 
the WTO.61  This was clearly a political throwaway vote.  Even if the 
resolution had passed both houses (and the Senate has never even considered 
such a resolution), every president since the GATT/WTO has existed, except 
possibly the present one, would have vetoed it, requiring a two-thirds vote in 
both houses to override.  Thus, despite the political rhetoric emanating from 
the White House, there remains a strong base of political support for the 
WTO system under the clouds currently hanging over the system. 
As the Trump administration enters its second year, however, the threat it 
presents to the stable trading system created seventy years ago under the 
persistent ideal of Cordell Hull and the leadership of Roosevelt and Truman 
is unmistakable. 
                                                                                                                   
 61  109 Cong. Rec. H4318 (2005); Congress Sidesteps Five-Year Debate On Costs, Benefits 
Of WTO Membership, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (June 23, 2010), http://www.insidetrade.com/se 
cure/display.asp?f=&dn=6232010_blog.  
